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role ofparticipation in the pursuit ofindividual rights. 
Liberalism and democratic theory in general depend on the three 
fundamental pillars ofself-government for their foundation: individual 
freedom, public regulation, and civic meaning. Liberalism in the last 60 
years has focused on the first of those pillars, using the second as a 
crutch, at the expense of the third. This is not a new observation; many 
authors have identified in different ways the tension liberalism has 
produced in modern democracy. Lowi's analysis of the "second 
republic," in American history and the explosion ofbureaucracy explores 
the far-reaching effects of a liberalism narrowed to a focus on regulative 
bureaucracy (Lowi, 1992). He argues that modern liberalism reliance on 
a national bureaucracy has created a new kind of democracy with policy­
makers more insulated from the will of the people. Lowi' s "interest group 
Liberalism" took the path of least resistance - it increased individual 
freedoms through regulative bureaucracy instead of engendering change 
in the hearts and minds ofthe citizenry. 
As Holmes argued in his work, Passions and Constraints, original 
liberal democratic theory had a heavy dose ofpositive constitutionalism. 
Constitutions, as early liberals envisioned, not only limit government 
power to ensure individual freedom but also establish structures that, "can 
ensure that the will of the people is formed through open public debate .. 
. can enhance the intelligence and legitimacy ofdecisions made" 
(Holmes, 1989:8). According to Holmes, original liberalism both assumes 
and requires the engendering ofparticipation and active individual 
engagement to counter regulatory power. In the end Holmes states that, 
"liberalism is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for some 
measure of democracy in any modern state" (Holmes, 1989:9). What he 
suggests is a co-existence, liberalism allows for and assumes republican 
concepts and participation. 
James Morone, in his work The Democratic Wish, identifies the 
"dread and yearning" of the American people (Morone, 1991). The 
dread ofgovernment, stems from "the perception that public power 
threatens civic liberty" (Morone, 1991 :2). The conflicting yearnings of 
the American people is the democratic wish. Key to the democratic 
wish, "is ~n image ofthe people-a single, united, political entity with the 
capacity, as John Adams put it, to 'think, feel, reason, and act'" (Morone, 
1991 :5). The American people have always assumed and strove for 
active participation according to Morone. The American ideology, as he 
terms it, is based on self-government, meaning active popular participation 
to prevent government action without the consent of the people. 
However, a stronger yearning, individualism, has allowed the American 
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people to be deluded into thinking the expansion ofgovernment is their 
own will and is actually protecting their desire to ensure self-government. 
Morone's portrait ofdemocracy's development in America ends in a 
disheartening conclusion. 
The state and its bureaucracy grew; however, they never 
won a legitimate role at the center of our society. 
Instead, two centuries of state building produced a string 
ofmetaphoricallegitimators for public administration: a 
mirror ofthe people (as the revolutionaries fancied their 
assemblies), a reflection ofthe people's choices 
(Jacksonians), the computation ofdisinterested science 
(Progressives), the outcome ofthe pluralistic political 
market (some New Dealers). Each formula was an 
effort to rest administrative authority on an external, 
automatically functioning source oflegitimacy. Each was 
a different escape from the same threat - public officials 
who make independent judgements, ministers who think. 
(Morone,1991:323) 
Morone argues that a republican yearning has existed throughout our 
history but that the yearning to be unencumbered has prevailed in shaping 
our democracy. I would argue that while to limited degrees this may be 
the case, in earlier periods this was simply the logical balancing of 
republican participatory ideals and individual freedoms. Only in the 
twentieth century has this delusion that regulation and bureaucracy can 
be an effective substitute for participation become hegemonic. 
Michael Sandel's analysis ofthe American public philosophy 
supports the above assertion. In his work, Democracy's Discontent, he 
defines the modern manifestation ofliberalism as one that, "asserts the 
priority of fair procedures over particular ends, the public life it informs 
might be call the procedural republic" (Sandel, 1996:4). Several key 
points and ideas are argued from this definition. The first is that, 
"freedom consists in the capacity of persons to choose their values and 
ends." (Sandel, 1996:5). Sandel terms this the priority ofthe right over 
the good. This means that our right to choose our own good trumps any 
controlling collective good. There is no common conception ofthe good 
life. Virtue comes in allowing citizens to choose their own ends. The 
second major point to be made from Sandel's definition is the implied 
neutrality of the state. In his procedural republic, the state does not 
perform any formative function. Lowi' s second republic, Holmes's 
negative constitutionalism, and Morone's self-delusion are different 
conceptions of very similar arguments. The explosion ofbureaucracy has 
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insulated the people from their government and de-emphasized civic 
participation. 
An essential flaw of Sandel and other critics of liberalism is their 
juxtapositionofliberalism to republicanism. Republicanism is not in 
opposition to liberalism. As some have suggested, these two public 
philosophies combine and rely on each other to maintain self-government. 
Richard Dagger, for example, argues that, "just as a liberal society must 
be able to count on a sense ofcommunity and civic engagement, so the 
republican polity that Sandel now champions must be able to count on a 
commitment to liberal principles, such as tolerance, fair play, and respect 
for others" (Dagger, 1998:4). Democracy relies on both philosophies for 
development and, in very practical ways, regime support. Without both 
sides of the equation democracy can be undercut. Narrow liberalism has 
de-emphasized but not destroyed republicanism. A resurgence of 
republicanism should not attempt to discredit a commitment to a broader 
liberal theory. 
"Central to republican theory is the idea that liberty depends on 
sharing in self-government ... sharing in self-rule involves ... 
deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good and helping to 
the destiny ofthe political community" (Sandel, 1996:5). Sandel 
misunderstood the implications ofhis own defInition ofrepublicanism. 
This defInition does not demand a communitarian model, where 
communal good supercedes all notions of individual rights. Neither does 
this defInition demand republicanism be set in opposition to liberalism. As 
Richard Dagger points out in his critique ofSandel, "we should pause to 
consider whether republicanism and liberalism share enough features to 
make a hybrid possible - perhaps in the form of a 'more civic-minded 
liberalism' that might be called republican liberalism" (Dagger, 1998:26). 
While Dagger seeks to find a hybrid, I contend the relationship should be 
conceptualized more as a necessary co-existence. There are distinct 
schools ofdemocratic thought and they cannot be combined into one 
overarching theory. Yet in the practical application ofdemocracy on a 
society, each requires the other for foundations and support. On the one 
hand, liberalism relies on republican virtue and self-government to create 
the type ofcitizens required for self-government; this in turn is the vehicle 
for individual freedom and liberties. On the other hand, republicanism 
relies on liberalism's commitment to tolerance, freedom and fairness to 
create a just society. Both are necessary but not suffIcient for 
democracy's development. 
Narrow liberalism does not allow for what Sandel terms "a 
formative politics." However, original liberalism accepted and relied on 
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the republican idea ofa non-neutral state. Holmes' argument for positive 
constitutionalism not only allows for but requires the cultivation ofcitizens 
able and inclined to participate and debate. Again, Sandel confuses 
original liberalism with its narrow implementation ofthe twentieth century. 
"The republican conceptionoffreedom, unlike the liberal conception, 
require a formative politics, a politics that cultivates in citizens the 
qualities ofcharacter self-government requires," (Sandel, 1996:6). 
Republicanism does envision a formative project. The cultivation ofcivic­
minded individuals is essential to self-government and therefore the 
protection ofindividual rights as well as the pursuit ofthe common good. 
The challenge is to develop new ways to engender this type of citizenry 
without coercion under our new understandings ofindividual rights. It is 
not as Sandel states that, "the liberal vision offreedom lacks the civic 
resources to sustain self-government," but that the practical 
implementation ofnarrow liberalism lacks the necessary institutional 
mechanisms. 
As opposed to the original, wide-reaching ideals found in liberal 
thought, the liberalism that has dominated the twentieth century has 
produced a society and a government focused on achievement in only one 
area. The focus on individual, private freedom has achieved great strides 
for the citizens of this country but at what cost? An essential piece of 
democracy is the civic ideal. Narrow liberalism has neglected the 
importance ofcivic culture and instead has relied solely on procedural 
regulation to maintain a government truly for the people. In the end, 
narrow liberalism has used procedural mechanisms to expand individual 
freedom while assuming that those mechanisms they have created will 
keep government in check and lessen the need for civic engagement. 
Self-government on auto-pilot is the order ofthe day for modern 
liberal theory. The reliance on regulative bureaucracy allows citizens to 
be concerned only with their own private, usually economic, well-being 
and undermine the crucial function ofcivic participation. The total de­
emphasis ofcivic meaning and inter-dependence will not lead to a total 
destruction ofdemocracy and free will. It will, however, prevent 
society's advance toward a more just and morally virtuous society. Ifwe 
are to understand where democracy stands and where it needs to go, a 
full definition ofdemocracy is required. 
What is Democracy? 
Democracy has been stated simply and in seemingly 
unmistakable terms. Abraham Lincoln's oft quoted assertion, 
"government of the people, by the people, and for the people," seems to 
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suggest what any fourth grader would tell you. Democracy is simply free 
government, based on the sovereignty of the people, advancing the will of 
the people. This type ofgovernment can be easily distinguished from 
non-democratic forms. Clear and unmistakable characteristics define a 
democracy. But this only describes democracy at the surface. These 
surface characteristics are important and necessary to democracy's 
foundation but they are not sufficient for its maintenance or development. 
In fact, the four surface characteristics are termed such because they are 
only products ofthe first two pillars ofdemocracy: individual freedom and 
public regulation. A democracy based only on two legs cannot stand. 
The third pillar ofdemocracy, civic meaning, produces more subtle 
characteristics ofdemocracy, which I term foundational characteristics. 
Surface Characteristics 
The first and most readily measured surface characteristic is 
structural mechanisms designed to ensure representation, such as free 
and open elections. To be a truly democratic influence on policy-makers, 
elections must be structured to ensure a wide definition of those who are 
qualified to vote. This is for legitimacy and to ensure that representative 
government is just that - representative. The great success of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 was that it widened the definition of 
democracy. But even with this seemingly clear characteristic, some 
distinctions and explanations must be made. An understanding is needed 
of exactly what is meant and what the intended results of elections. 
Democratic theorists have debated two elements or conceptions of role 
of elections. I will present these as the idealist version and the realist 
version ofelections. Joseph Schumpeter articulates the realist position, 
"the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter, 
1997:366). Elections simply serve as a check on those in power. But 
only in so far as to allow "the people" to choose which set of elites will 
govern. According to Schumpeter, the idealist position ignores the 
essential and natural selection ofleaders. True government by the people 
is unattainable and impractical. Democratic theory is moving toward this 
new realization, Schumpeter argues. The idealists contend that free and 
open elections are part of the essential process of debate and discussion. 
Elections are not designed to give the populous direct control over policy; 
they are principally designed to translate the doctrine ofpopular 
sovereignty into an operating principle or institutional practice (Mayo, 
1997:372). Elections are obvious and essential points in the process of 
40 
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self-government by which "the people's" will is measured. For idealist­
and I count my self as one - elections not only allow Schumpeter's 
"throwing the bums out," but also legitimate the government and ensure 
that, between elections, those in power listen to public debate and govern 
by it or face the same fate as those they replaced. A fuller treatment of 
the role and effectiveness ofpublic discourse follows later. 
Another surface characteristic of democracy is a commitment to 
freedoms, both political and individual. Political freedom refers to the 
ability to choose freely a representative body. Voters must be allowed to 
make their own decision without coercion or intimidation. Essential to this 
process is the existence of formal procedural rules such as secret ballot, 
freedom to run for office, freedom of press and speech, and assembly 
and organization for political purposes (Mayo 1997:374). The legitimate 
operation and inclusion ofopposition parties and opinions is a measure of 
a government's commitment to democracy. Governments such as the 
former Soviet Union, Communist China, and the hegemonic PRl in 
Mexico display all the trappings ofdemocratic elections, but these are 
only skin deep. The lack ofany viable opposition and preordained 
elections results sweep away any claim to democracy. Fundamental to 
democracy's effectiveness and stability is a commitment and 
maintenance ofindividual freedoms. Rights ofprivacy, religion, basic 
education, and economic self-determination are just some ofthe rights 
demanded. The protection of individual rights maintains and engenders 
popular support for the regime and a sense of government working to 
protect each citizen. This understanding of rights is part ofwhat Richard 
Wilson defines as compliance ideologies - those standards and norms, 
decided on by society, ensured by the government, which protect and 
stabilize the current political structure (Wilson, 1992). 
Commitment to political and social equality is also a necessary 
,	 trademark ofmodem democracy. This distinction parallels the above 
concerning freedoms. Political equality again refers to electoral structure 
and outcomes. For political equality to be achieved, each citizen shall 
have one vote, each vote shall count equally and the representatives 
elected shall be proportional to the number ofequal votes (Mayo, 1997). 
Political equality again ensures legitimacy and translates popular 
sovereignty into structural outcomes. Social equality is measured through 
the policy outcomes but is achieved through wide popular consensus. 
This implies another problem with narrow liberalism. Modem liberals 
measure success or progress in procedural reforms and not societal 
attitudes and norms. The belief is that government can produce mass 
attitudinal change through regulation. While this does happen to a limited 
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degree, social attitudes are altered one person at time and not by 
centralized regulation. Nevertheless, at this juncture it is important only to 
note that modem democracy must display a commitment both to political 
equality and to social equality. 
Majoritarianism is the fourth surface characteristic and presents 
an internal tension, which must also be addressed in any attempt to define 
democratic structure. Democracy's claim to representation is seemingly 
at odds with the notions ofmajority rule. That is to say if the majority will 
prevails those in the minority are not represented in policy. As 
Schumpeter put it, "the will of the majority is the will ofthe majority and 
not the will of 'the people, '" (Schumpeter, 1997:368). But this does not 
necessarily exclude the claim of government "by the people." As 
Maciver, Mayo, Lindsay and others have argued democracy is not a form 
ofpolicy development; it is a system to determine who governs and to 
what ends (Cohen, 1997). Many consider majoritarian aspects of 
democracy beneficial and stabilizing when counter-balanced with a 
society-wide commitment to minority rights. The very fact that when 
universal consensus cannot be achieved, which is almost always the case, 
the majority prevails only ensures democracy's survival and continued 
mass support of the government structure. It is important to note that this 
is not a carte blanche for Tocqueville's feared "tyranny ofthe majority." 
This, in the end, benefits all in the society by maintaining its egalitarian 
aspects and structural opportunities for minorities while maintaining 
stability and long-term support. Now that we have an understanding of 
the surface characteristics of democracy, a discussion of the foundational 
characteristics - those necessary for the maintenance and future 
development ofthe third pillar ofdemocracy, civic meaning - is needed. 
Foundational Characteristics 
Democratic theorists have been struggling for centuries with the 
notions ofparticipation and community ends. Both ofwhich I claim to be 
the essential underpinnings ofdemocracy and its future progress. For 
democracy to make the virtuous claim of self-government, there must be 
continuous input and oversight by "the people." This is a very different 
claim than modem liberal theorists have pragmatically put into practice. 
Narrow liberalism's tunnel vision toward an expansion ofindividual rights 
and liberties have forced it to use regulation and interest group pressure in 
place of true community participation. Democracy cannot stand on 
interest groups and regulation alone so that individuals may spend all of 
their efforts toward their own ends. In order to develop and advance to a 
more virtuous kind ofdemocracy, the expansions in individual rights and 
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h must also be addressed in any attempt to define 
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)fmajority rule. That is to say ifthe majority will 
ority are not represented in policy. As 
rill ofthe majority is the will ofthe majority and 
e,'" (Schumpeter, 1997:368). But this does not 
;laim ofgovernment "by the people." As 
rand others have argued democracy is not a form 
t is a system to determine who governs and to 
). Many consider majoritarian aspects of 
d stabilizing when counter-balanced with a 
nt to minority rights. The very fact that when 
not be achieved, which is almost always the case, 
yensures democracy's survival and continued 
~mment structure. It is important to note that this 
Tocqueville's feared "tyranny of the majority." 
all in the society by maintaining its egalitarian 
portunities for minorities while maintaining 
:upport. Now that we have an understanding of 
cs ofdemocracy, a discussion of the foundational 
necessary for the maintenance and future 
lpillar ofdemocracy, civic meaning - is needed. 
Ilndational Characteristics 
)rists have been struggling for centuries with the 
and community ends. Both ofwhich I claim to be 
ngs ofdemocracy and its future progress. For 
virtuous claim of self-government, there must be 
ersight by "the people." This is a very different 
il theorists have pragmatically put into practice. 
leI vision toward an expansion of individual rights 
1it to use regulation and interest group pressure in 
rparticipation. Democracy cannot stand on 
lation alone so that individuals may spend all of 
r own ends. In order to develop and advance to a 
mocracy, the expansions in individual rights and 
Taylor 
procedural regulation must be matched in kind by a new conception and 
understanding of civic meaning and new ways to engender the formative 
project ofcultivating citizens capable of self-government. This is a very 
basic fact that liberal policy ofthe last fifty years has unintentionally 
undermined. 
At this juncture, a brief return to representation is necessary. 
The argument to be made for a newly found emphasis on participation 
begs the question ofwhat exactly is participation and how effectively is 
that translated into policy. At a most basic level, participation is simply 
voting. But, as stated previously, this does not ensure the designed 
representation both in the assemblies and in the policy outputs. Some 
would argue that to be truly virtuous participation must have a direct 
effect on policy. Otherwise, it has been diluted in its power and "the 
people" are a little less self-governed. While in a utopian setting this 
argument might be logically posited, it cannot be a serious consideration in 
the modem world. 
As suggested by several authors, the Athenian model and 
universal assent can no longer define participation. Participation now 
means the opportunity and ability to engage in debate. Each member of a 
society must undertake the absolute necessity ofdiscussing the issues of 
the day. As Lindsay argued, "what matters is not that the final decision 
of government should be assented to by every one, but that every one 
should have somehow made his contribution to that decision" (Lindsay, 
1997:362-3). It is the responsibility of the assembly to set the agenda and 
provide a calming force to the volatile winds ofpublic opinion, but without 
free and open debate assemblies can make no claim of continuous 
representation. In modem society we see the unmistakable breakdown in 
participation - debate, discussion, and voting - narrow liberalism has 
implanted a reliance on regulative bureaucracy and interest groups to 
ensure the individual rights over government encroachment. The concern 
is two-fold. Under a structure reliant on procedure, regulation and 
bureaucracy, how legitimate is the claim ofself-rule. And, as Lindsay 
points out debate should lead to responsive representative assemblies, is 
this input occurring at all and, if so, is the bureaucracy listening and 
responsive to individual participation. Lindsay's pronouncement, "what 
matters is not that the people should rule, but that they think they should 
rule; and it has given undue emphasis to the element of consent over the 
element ofdiscussion" (Lindsay 1997:359), now seems evenmore 
ominous in the face ofa democracy purposefully put on auto-pilot in the 
pursuit ofindividualism. 
Individualism and a reliance on regulative bureaucracy alone 
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cannot advance democracy and help our society develop further. 
"Democracy is a kind ofcommunity government" (Cohen, 1997:357). 
This simple observation has not been advanced in the narrow liberalism of 
the twentieth century, yet I maintain civic meaning or community is the 
second foundational underpinning ofself-government. Ifthe goal ofour 
society is to produce full, complete and virtuous citizens, and I believe it 
is, attention must be given to the notion that we cannot act as if our lives 
and actions affect no one but ourselves. It is an inescapable truth that 
we, as Sandel terms it, are "encumbered." This fact is a strength, not a 
weakness. Without interpersonal contact and responsibility we cannot 
become complete human beings. "The keynote of democracy as a way 
of life may be expressed, it seems to me, as the necessity for the 
participation ofevery mature human being in the formation ofvalues that 
regulate the living ofmen together: which is necessary from the 
standpoint ofboth the general social welfare and the full development of 
human beings as individuals," (Dewey, 1997:378). 
Two important elements can be found in the above argument. 
First, it is absolutely essential "for the participation ofevery mature 
human being." Working with the above description ofparticipation, the 
reason for its necessity should become clear. Democracy, as do all forms 
ofgovernment, establishes and enforces community norms and standards. 
Without individuals engaging and participating in our government, it 
ceases to be our government; we cease to be self-ruled. As Dewey 
clearly argues, "all those who are affected by social institutions must have 
a share in producing and managing them," (Dewey, 1997:378). "General 
social welfare" cannot be determined, let alone achieved, with a 
completely atomistic, self-interested view ofthe individual. Society's 
commitment to freedom, equality, justice, and virtue requires input from 
the people. The ends sought by narrow liberalism cannot be achieved 
and protected without civic-minded individuals. 
A brief discussion on ends versus means should be helpful to my 
point. Since Hobbes, liberals have debated whether the goal ofcivil 
society should be the development of shared ends or shared means. My 
contention is that democracy requires civic individuals engaged in their 
community to develop consensus on shared means to individual 
development and personal definitions of success. However, in the 
process we also have a shared end, the development of a virtuous society 
that allows for the growth ofcomplete human beings. John Rawls 
discussed this issue in terms ofconcepts and conceptions. This is very 
useful for the points made above. The goal ofour democracy is to 
achieve a consensus on the concepts of community norms. It is 
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absolutely essential that a self-governed society actively engages in and 
debates those concepts continuously. This is so because each individual's 
conception of those concepts ofjustice, freedom and equality change and 
develop over time. They are not static definitions; rather, as we grow and 
develop so must our conceptions. And when those conceptions change at 
the individua11eve1, eventually a new consensus ofthe concepts is defined 
and we as a society have grown and moved toward our goal ofmore 
complete individuals. 
The challenge for our democracy is to find new and inventive 
ways to engender and support civic-minded citizens without coercion or 
trampling the advances we have made in our concepts of individual rights 
and freedoms. "Merely legal guarantees of the civil liberties of free 
belief, free expression, free assembly are oflitt1e avail if in our daily life 
freedom ofcommunication, the give and take of ideas, facts, experiences, 
is choked by mutual suspicion, by abuse, by fear and hatred. These 
things destroy the essential condition ofthe democratic way," (Dewey, 
1997:382). Democracy is not simply a structure established by our 
founding fathers, that we can ignore and disengage from in the pursuit of 
self-interested individualistic goals. The foundation ofdemocracy relies 
on the need for civic engagement and development. Without it our 
development as complete human beings and a truly just and virtuous 
society are hampered. "The heart and final guarantee of democracy is in 
the free gatherings of neighbors on the street comer to discuss back and 
forth what is read in uncensored news of the day, and in the gatherings of 
friends in the living rooms ofhouses and apartments to converse freely 
with one another," (Dewey, 381-382). The challenge is to find new 
neighborhoods, new street comers, new ways of engaging our citizens 
and engendering civic virtue. 
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